2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

3 May 2010
English
Original: Russian

National report on the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by the Russian Federation

Introduction

1. This report has been prepared for the eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and contains information on the implementation of its articles by the Russian Federation over the period that has elapsed since the seventh Review Conference was held in 2005.

2. The indefinitely extended Treaty is a time-tested instrument that for the past 40 years has effectively averted the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, allowed further progress towards nuclear disarmament and guaranteed the development of broad international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

3. Recent years have clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of the balanced structure of obligations of the States parties to the Treaty. All States — large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear — need this Treaty.

4. The urgency of taking effective non-proliferation measures on the basis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is also dictated today by the danger of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists. This means that we need to strengthen the international "safety net" that makes it possible to manage such risks in advance.

5. The international community's current concern about existing global challenges with respect to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament was highlighted during the United Nations Security Council summit of 24 September 2009, which was a positive prelude to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Security Council resolution 1887 (2009), which was adopted at the summit, confirmed the most important thing: that all the new challenges to the non-proliferation regime, including the emergence of "black" nuclear markets, can and should first be addressed within the Non-Proliferation Treaty framework. The Russian Federation is ready to engage in close international partnership in this area.

6. The tasks of countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be dealt with in strict compliance with the norms of international law and with due account taken of the legitimate development and security interests of all States. The Treaty should therefore be fully and effectively implemented in years to come. In this regard we believe that the 2010 Review Conference should focus on a

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comprehensive and objective review of every aspect of implementation of the Treaty, reaffirm its viability as the most important tool for averting the threat of nuclear-weapon proliferation and reiterate the commitment of the States parties to fulfil their obligations, as well as agree on a joint "package" of effective and feasible steps towards further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime in order to make the Treaty universal.

7. As a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and one of its depositaries, the Russian Federation is consistent in fulfilling its obligations under the Treaty and confirms its strong and unfailing support for it.

8. The role of the Russian Federation in ensuring implementation of, and compliance with, the provisions and articles of the Treaty is described below.

Articles I and II

9. The Russian Federation, as a nuclear-weapon State, strictly complies with its obligations under article I of the Treaty not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly. The Russian Federation never in any way assists, encourages, or induces any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

10. The Russian Federation believes that strict compliance with article II of the Treaty is one of the main guarantees against the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States.

Article III

11. Application of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards under this article of the Treaty is an important prerequisite for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and an assurance of the implementation of their obligations by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

12. The Russian Federation supports the efforts of IAEA in this field and considers it essential to further strengthen the verification role of the Agency, including the legal, organizational and technical aspects of that role. In this context, the universal conclusion of additional protocols to IAEA safeguards agreements is particularly important, and the Russian Federation urges States that have not yet signed or ratified an additional protocol to do so as soon as possible.

13. The Russian Federation ratified its Additional Protocol in 2007 (Federal Act No. 227-FZ of 2 October 2007).

14. Additional protocols are aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States by detecting possible undeclared activities. The introduction of integrated safeguards is essential for improving the technical and economic effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system.

15. The existence of an additional protocol should be one of the factors to be taken into account when considering nuclear export possibilities. At present the Russian

Federation is willing to regard it as one of the conditions for transferring sensitive nuclear technology and equipment.

16. In order to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, the Russian Federation provides the Agency with financial assistance for carrying out its verification role through a national programme of scientific and technical support for safeguards. In the 26 years of the programme's existence, a significant number of studies have been completed, aimed at strengthening the technical database of the Department of Safeguards of the IAEA secretariat and providing new methods of measurement as well as training materials and information sources for its staff.

17. The programme currently covers a range of work that includes analyses in Russian laboratories of environmental samples collected by IAEA inspectors, training courses in modern methods of non-destructive analysis and in accounting for and control of nuclear materials, inspections of gas centrifuge enrichment plants and the development of new technologies for the detection of undeclared nuclear activities.

18. With the large-scale development of civilian nuclear energy around the world and the emergence of countries that did not previously possess it, there is an increased risk of the proliferation of technologies that can be used to obtain weapons-grade nuclear materials. The Russian Federation and other Group of Eight (G-8) States have developed, and adopted in national legislation, strict but objective criteria governing transfers to non-nuclear States of the most sensitive nuclear equipment and technology, such as for uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The most important criterion is that the importing State must be a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. With respect to uranium enrichment technology, it is transferred only when appropriate and without revealing basic elements that could be diverted to the production of weapons-grade material. We are working on the universal acceptance of these criteria in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

19. The Russian Federation regards the strengthening of multilateral export control regimes as one of the most important instruments to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and technology. Enhancing their efficiency and transparency, as well as involving countries possessing relevant technologies in their operation would, in our view, prevent unauthorized transfers of controlled nuclear items and technology.

20. The national export control system of the Russian Federation is based on control lists and export regulations for the listed items which were established in conformity with the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. We have supported their activities ever since they were created and we believe that they have defined an agreed procedure for the transfer of controlled products without infringing upon the legitimate rights of States to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. The Russian Federation seeks further dialogue and constructive interaction with all countries, including those outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in order to assist them in creating and improving national systems of nuclear export control.

21. The Russian Federation attaches great importance to coordinating international efforts to address the risks of nuclear proliferation. It supports consistent and universal implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which is aimed at countering "black markets" in weapons of mass destruction and preventing

such weapons, related materials, technology and their means of delivery from falling into the hands of non-State actors, in particular terrorist organizations. The Russian Federation takes an active part in the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for its effective implementation.

22. The Russian Federation participates in the IAEA programme to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Our country, with the support of the Agency, organizes international training courses for experts in physical protection.

23. At present, a great deal has already been done to establish an effective international "safety net" to prevent nuclear weapons and materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. It should be noted, in this context, that IAEA has been making significant systematic efforts to strengthen the physical nuclear security regime worldwide. In this connection, we note the successful implementation of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009.

24. One of the most important areas of work is the development by IAEA of a series of publications on physical nuclear security, including one on the goals and basic principles of physical nuclear security, and also the Agency's recommendations, including the revised version of the document entitled "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities" (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)). Russian experts participate actively in the preparation of these documents.

25. The training of experts in physical protection is extremely important. IAEA training courses on physical protection are conducted regularly in the Russian Federation at the Interdepartmental Special Training Centre in Obninsk. Eighteen IAEA training courses have been held since 2001, providing training to over 300 foreign experts. A regional training course on the physical protection of research reactors was held at Tomsk Polytechnic University.

26. Particularly noteworthy is the programme for the maintenance of the IAEA database on illegal trafficking in nuclear materials and radioactive substances. The Russian Federation participates actively in the exchange of information and reports officially to IAEA on incidents that have occurred in its territory.

27. Work at IAEA is currently being conducted on the basis of the Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-2013, which focuses on strengthening physical nuclear security in order to avert possible incidents of nuclear terrorism. While stressing that the physical protection of nuclear material is the priority, it is also necessary to ensure the safety and security of radioactive substances and sources. In order to counter the radiological threat, activities for the protection of this type of material should be conducted at a new, higher level. Given that the threat of terrorism is international in nature, we consider it necessary to strengthen multilateral and bilateral mechanisms for cooperation to address that threat.

28. On 6 July 2009, the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States adopted a joint statement on nuclear cooperation in which they confirmed their commitment to strengthening their cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and stop acts of nuclear terrorism. Building upon previous joint efforts, experience and achievements, they declared an intent to broaden and deepen long-term cooperation to further increase the level of security of nuclear facilities around the world. This includes plans to continue the repatriation of spent highly

enriched uranium fuel from research reactors, the development of new types of low-enriched uranium fuel for them and the possible conversion of research reactor cores in third countries. We invite all IAEA member States to join in this work.

29. The Russian Federation has made a crucial decision that, starting in 2010, it will make a significant voluntary contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. We expect that this contribution will help to further strengthen the physical nuclear security regime.

30. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism announced in 2006 by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States is making a significant contribution to this work. The Initiative is now taking on a global dimension. Seventy-nine States and four observer organizations (IAEA, the European Union, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) have already joined. This is a positive example of how we can come together in the world today to combat new challenges and threats.

31. Such key international instruments as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Amendment to this Convention and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism serve as a basis for joint action. The Russian Federation has ratified these conventions, including the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We consider that the entry into force of the Amendment will make it possible to strengthen substantially the international physical nuclear security regime. Progress is hampered, however, by the fact that most States parties to the Convention have not yet accepted the Amendment.

32. The Russian Federation considers that ensuring the security and safety of radioactive sources is an important means of preventing the uncontrolled proliferation of hazardous materials used to produce the "dirty bomb". We support multilateral efforts in this area. We support IAEA activities aimed at ensuring secure handling of radioactive sources. We commend the adoption of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the formulation of the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. The Russian Federation is assisting IAEA in drafting the International Catalogue of Sealed Radioactive Sources and Devices, which also contributes to enhancing control over them.

33. The Russian Federation, as a major producer, consumer and exporter of radioactive sources, is actively working to establish an export/import control regime for these sources. We are taking steps to harmonize national norms and regulations with international principles.

34. The Russian Federation has elaborated and put in place a sophisticated national legislative and regulatory framework for handling radioactive materials which makes it possible to reliably ensure their transportation security and meets all IAEA requirements. We are in favour of strengthening the regime governing the transportation of such materials which has been adopted by the international community. However, we consider that it should not result in the erection of artificial barriers which are often incompatible with universally recognized norms of international law.

Article IV

35. The Russian Federation believes that in the immediate future there is no alternative to the further development and expansion of the use of civilian nuclear energy around the world.

36. Energy consumption across the world is growing rapidly. In the second half of the twenty-first century, stocks of oil and natural gas will be virtually exhausted. Emissions of greenhouse gases into the planet's atmosphere must be drastically reduced. In practical terms, this problem can be solved only through the development of nuclear energy.

37. The Russian Federation consistently advocates broader access of the NPT States parties to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy and promotes international cooperation in this sphere. We believe that it is crucially important to make further efforts to enhance the role and authority of IAEA, a competent and responsible organization which provides for such cooperation on a global scale. This will make it possible to strike the necessary balance between harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

38. The further development of nuclear energy and its large-scale use for the purposes of economic development require a systemic approach to tackling new fundamental and complex tasks. It was with these issues in mind that, at the United Nations Millennium Summit, the President of the Russian Federation proposed an initiative on energy provision for the sustainable development of humankind and radical ways to address the issues of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the environmental protection of planet Earth. In line with this initiative IAEA is implementing the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). Its primary objective is to create nuclear energy systems that are economically competitive, environmentally safe and capable of reducing the risk of proliferation and ensuring the sustainable development of civilization.

39. We welcome the results and the positive direction of the work under INPRO. We support the new approach adopted by the Department of Nuclear Energy of IAEA in organizing working meetings with national delegations from INPRO participating States. At the first such meeting, which was held in January 2009 in Moscow, a range of issues connected with the implementation of the project were discussed with representatives of the IAEA secretariat.

40. We support the efforts of the Agency's secretariat to ensure budgetary funding for the project. The Russian Federation has decided for the first time to provide long-term financing for the project for 2008-2012. It will make an annual contribution of 23 million roubles. We believe that this funding will make it possible to plan the implementation of the project and set tasks for the future.

41. INPRO makes it possible to bring together all interested participating States — both those that possess and those that use the technologies in question — in order to explore together ways of meeting the energy needs of the participating States.

42. In the future the INPRO platform could become the basis for new types of partnership through which IAEA member States could work together to create favourable conditions for the introduction of innovative nuclear energy systems.

43. The number of countries participating in the project has reached 28, in addition to the European Commission, and the fact that some of the participating countries are also involved in a United States-led programme — Generation IV International Forum — calls for closer interaction between these two projects. The Russian Federation acceded to the Generation IV Framework Agreement on 30 July 2009.

44. The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project is yet another example of the Russian Federation's successful participation in multilateral cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. A unique engineering project has been developed for the reactor, a site has been chosen and practical work on implementation has begun.

45. The Russian Federation's involvement in the construction of ITER serves its long-term scientific, economic and political interests in developing nuclear energy and is a logical step for the Russian Federation on the way to mastering thermonuclear technology. As part of its commitment, the Russian Federation will manufacture and deliver to the construction site unique equipment for the reactor's main systems. The Russian Federation is fulfilling all of its obligations, including the manufacture of superconductors, in full compliance with the high standards of the ITER project.

46. Analysis of the technical aspects of promising innovations can be used to investigate problems and the process of establishing an international nuclear energy structure.

47. The inalienable right of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, under article IV of the Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes presupposes the ability to develop a national nuclear fuel cycle, some elements of which are highly sensitive with respect to non-proliferation. It is therefore necessary to guarantee reliable conditions for the implementation of national nuclear programmes by resolving the related non-proliferation issues.

48. The Russian Federation believes it is essential to create an environment that would limit the spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies while not hampering the development of a large-scale nuclear energy industry.

49. We consider that this work could be based on the development and implementation of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, which would offer an economically sound and feasible alternative to developing every element of the cycle at the national level.

50. Tackling the nuclear fuel cycle problem on an international basis would be advantageous from the point of view of the economy, the environment and security, as well as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We welcome the results of the work done by the IAEA expert group to consider possible international approaches to sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies.

51. A number of initiatives have been proposed in recent years in this area at the national and multilateral levels. In January 2006, the President of the Russian Federation proposed working jointly to develop a global nuclear energy infrastructure and to establish international nuclear fuel cycle service centres. In 2007, as a first practical contribution to the implementation of this approach, the Russian Federation, in partnership with Kazakhstan, established the International

Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) at Angarsk. Armenia and Ukraine have also joined the Centre.

52. In January 2008, we officially informed IAEA that IUEC had been listed as one of the Russian nuclear fuel cycle enterprises to which IAEA safeguards could be applied. In 2008, IUEC obtained all the necessary permits and licences to operate as a supplier of products and services.

53. We are grateful that IAEA has welcomed the Russian initiative. We concur with IAEA that the Centre is capable not only of resolving the issue of guaranteed access to nuclear fuel cycle services but also of ensuring nuclear fuel supplies from a guaranteed reserve of low-enriched uranium in response to IAEA requests.

54. The establishment of a guaranteed reserve is an alternative to the expensive option of establishing all the elements of the nuclear fuel cycle at the national level.

55. On 27 November 2009, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2009/81 concerning the Russian initiative to establish a reserve of low-enriched uranium to supply IAEA for its member States. Fourteen States sponsored the resolution.

56. The adoption of the resolution paved the way for an agreement between the Russian Federation and IAEA providing for the establishment in the Russian Federation of a 120-ton physical reserve of five-per-cent-enriched uranium.

57. On 29 March 2010, the Director General of Rosatom, Sergei Kirienko, and the Director General of IAEA, Yukiya Amano, signed the agreement.

58. The Russian proposal is based on article IX of the IAEA Statute. There is no breach or infringement of the rights of IAEA member States, including the right to develop their own nuclear fuel cycle production capability. In other words, in order for them to receive low-enriched uranium from the guaranteed reserve, they are not required to waive the right to establish and develop their own fuel cycle. We are not proposing such a condition. The guaranteed reserve is a response to the concerns of those who fear that they will become fully dependent on nuclear fuel market conditions or on the political will of certain States.

59. Our proposal for the establishment of a reserve of low-enriched uranium was prepared on the basis of the following considerations. The fundamental guarantee of a reliable supply of nuclear fuel is a normally functioning market in which both suppliers and consumers meet their contractual obligations. The purpose of a guaranteed reserve is to provide nuclear fuel to consumers in the event that they face insurmountable political difficulties in obtaining low-enriched uranium that are unrelated to non-proliferation issues.

60. There will be no need for additional IAEA budget expenditure or contributions from IAEA member States. The Russian Federation will bear the costs associated, inter alia, with the production of the reserve, its storage and maintenance, and the application of IAEA safeguards. The State receiving the material will pay the current market price for the material supplied. The guaranteed reserve will not undermine the existing market for low-enriched uranium.

61. The establishment and use of the guaranteed reserve is governed by two agreements. One is an agreement between the Russian Federation and the Agency on the provision of a reserve of low-enriched uranium in accordance with article IX of

the IAEA Statute. The other is a model agreement between IAEA and potential recipient States.

62. The mechanism for supplying low-enriched uranium from the guaranteed reserve is triggered by a decision of the Director General of IAEA, and the uranium is delivered immediately at his request. There is no need for the IAEA Board of Governors to discuss each individual delivery. Neither the Russian Federation nor any other State has any influence over the decision of the IAEA Director General.

63. When a member State of IAEA concludes an agreement with the Agency for the supply of low-enriched uranium, the following conditions must be met from the point of view of the Russian Federation's domestic legislation and international obligations: the nuclear materials must not be used for purposes relating to the development of nuclear weapons; nuclear and physical safety must be ensured; the nuclear material must remain under IAEA safeguards throughout its use in the recipient country; and the material must be used only for the declared purpose, that is, to produce electricity at a specific nuclear power station.

64. The material may be supplied to any non-nuclear IAEA member State that is not in breach of its safeguards agreement and has placed all its peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.

65. The Russian proposal does not conflict with other well-known initiatives and in no way competes with them.

66. In March 2005, the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation adopted a law ratifying the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. The Russian Federation thus acknowledged the primacy of international law in regulating civil liability for nuclear damage. This step will facilitate our cooperation with other countries with regard to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

67. The Russian Federation attaches great importance to ensuring the safety of its nuclear facilities, viewing it as a condition sine qua non for developing the nuclear energy industry. It is an active party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. As mandated by the Convention, the Russian Federation prepared national reports reflecting its compliance with the obligations to ensure nuclear safety in the country and submitted them at the meetings held in 2005 and 2008 for the review of national reports.

68. We attach great importance to the IAEA programme of technical assistance and cooperation. The Russian Federation makes and will continue to make full voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund. We are in favour of retaining the existing funding mechanism through assessments of member States in their national currency in an amount determined by the United Nations scale of assessments in accordance with established practice. Over the course of many years the Russian Federation has actively cooperated with the Agency in implementing projects that seek effective use of applied nuclear technology in areas that are important for developing the economies of IAEA member States.

69. The Russian Federation has expanded its participation in safety- and security-related projects, including projects dealing with the safety of nuclear facilities, radiation security and the safety of transportation and radioactive waste management.

70. The Russian Federation has also been actively contributing to training skilled national personnel for other countries and conducting scientific research, which are important elements of technical assistance activities.

71. Large-scale training efforts are an important part of the Russian programme. Following a decision taken in 2008, the Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute (which is known for its history of excellence in training experts) and a number of regional educational institutions formed the National Nuclear Research University.

72. We will be pleased to accept foreign students and experts for training and retraining for the national nuclear energy programmes of IAEA member States.

73. The Russian Federation is assisting developing countries that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in building accelerators and neutron generators; it also supplies neutron radiography units, gamma-ray treatment equipment, liquid nitrogen production units, ionizing radiation sources, and other equipment and materials. We are willing to look into the possibility of cooperating in building low- and medium-power reactors, including mobile nuclear power stations with long-life no-reload operation. Such stations could be run and fully controlled by a supplying State. The Russian Federation is ready to proceed with the construction of a 70 MW offshore nuclear power station capable of both producing electricity and desalinating water.

74. The Russian Federation is taking part in the IAEA programme to develop a network of regional international training and demonstration centres for reprocessing and storage of radioactive waste produced as a result of applying nuclear methods in health care, scientific research and industry.

75. The Russian Federation attaches utmost importance to developing cooperation with States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — namely, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus — in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This will establish the legal framework required for the implementation of specific bilateral projects.

76. The third Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, held in May 2009, highlighted the return of spent fuel from research reactors as a positive and effective practice. The repatriation of highly enriched uranium fuel from Russian- and American-designed research reactors in third countries takes place through cooperation between the Russian Federation and the United States with IAEA involvement. The Russian Federation supports the IAEA programme aimed at reducing the level of enrichment of nuclear fuel for research reactors to below 20 per cent. The implementation of this programme will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation of highly enriched uranium.

77. International cooperation will to a great extent determine the success of these costly projects, which often require the development of non-standard technological solutions but which are pressing from an environmental standpoint and in terms of nuclear and physical security. In this connection, the Russian Federation confirms its intention to become one of the donors to a project for the removal of spent nuclear fuel from the Vinča research reactor in Serbia. The Russian Federation has decided to assist Ukraine in enhancing safety at the Chernobyl nuclear power station and accelerating the decommissioning of the facility. To this end, in 2009 we donated $10 million to the Nuclear Safety Account and $7 million to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund.

78. As a practical contribution to strengthening safety, the Russian Federation has assisted Armenia in enhancing safety at the Armenian nuclear power station under the IAEA technical cooperation programme. We provided 240 million roubles for that purpose in 2008 and are participating very actively in the implementation of the Armenian projects.

79. Given the high level to which nuclear technology has been developed in the Russian Federation, we have declined virtually all technical assistance from IAEA through national projects.

Article V

80. In 1990, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declared a moratorium on nuclear testing. Since then, no nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in our country. We intend to pursue this course in the future. We hope that the other nuclear Powers will take a similar approach.

81. The Russian Federation ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2000. We remain committed to this Treaty, which makes an essential contribution to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We are convinced that a comprehensive and no-threshold ban on any nuclear explosions is an effective means of restraining the qualitative improvement of nuclear warheads.

82. Progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons depends to a great extent on ensuring that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty becomes universal and on the accession to it of all States possessing nuclear capability, that is, on the early entry into force of the Treaty and strict compliance with all its provisions.

83. We are making our contribution to the attainment of this objective. We are pursuing a consistent policy aimed at facilitating the early entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Our view is that a moratorium on nuclear testing, important as it may be, cannot be a substitute for the international legal obligations set out in the Treaty.

84. In addition to bilateral work, we consistently participate in relevant multilateral activities. Our country has been a consistent sponsor of the resolutions in support of the Treaty adopted for a number of years by the United Nations General Assembly. We attend the "Friends of the CTBT" meetings of Ministers for Foreign Affairs that take place biennially on the margins of the General Assembly. One important element of efforts to ensure the entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty convened biennially by the United Nations Secretary-General in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty. We participate actively in these conferences, the most recent of which was held in New York in 2009.

85. The Russian Federation fully supports the gradual and balanced creation of a verification mechanism within the framework of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We are working on establishing the Russian segment of the International Monitoring System (IMS) envisaged by the Treaty. In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, the Russian segment of IMS comprises 6 basic and 13 auxiliary seismic stations, as well as 4 infrasound stations, 8 radionuclide stations and 1 radionuclide laboratory (a total of 32 IMS facilities).

86. The Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) on measures regarding facilities in the International Monitoring System provided for in the Treaty, entered into force in 2006. The Agreement provides a reliable legal framework for expanding cooperation between the Russian Federation and the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, and also enables us to speed up work to create a Russian IMS segment — a key element of verification of compliance with the Treaty — and ensure its operation until the Treaty enters into force.

87. We are also actively cooperating with the efforts of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission to establish another part of the Treaty verification mechanism: the on-site inspection regime. Russian inspectors and observers participated in the integrated on-site inspection exercise conducted in Kazakhstan in 2008. This exercise was an important milestone in the establishment of a unique global CTBT verification mechanism.

Article VI

88. Recognizing that it has special responsibility, both as a nuclear Power and as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to meet its obligations on disarmament under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Russian Federation, in a spirit of goodwill, continues to carry out deep, irreversible and verifiable reductions of its strategic offensive arms.

89. The signing in Prague on 8 April 2010 of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was an important step in this direction.

90. This new Treaty replaces one of the most significant disarmament treaties in history: the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) of 31 July 1991, which expired on 4 December 2009.

91. START I performed a historic role in ensuring international peace, strategic stability and security. It laid the foundations for a qualitatively new atmosphere of trust, openness and predictability in the strategic offensive arms reduction process, which is now reflected in the new Treaty. The deep reductions undertaken by the two parties since the end of the Cold War have made the world more stable and secure and have dispelled the feeling of constant threat that was hanging over the people of our countries and others. They have allowed us to move from an era of "co-existence" to a stage of partnership and mutually beneficial cooperation, thus creating a completely different military and political environment in the world.

92. Under START I, the two parties undertook to reduce their number of deployed strategic delivery vehicles to no more than 1,600 each and the number of warheads attributed to them to no more than 6,000 each within seven years of the Treaty's entry into force. The Russian Federation fully met its arms reduction obligations and, by the verification date of 5 December 2001, it had actually reduced its aggregate number of deployed strategic delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers) to 1,136 and the number of warheads attributed to them to 5,518.

93. Even though the Russian Federation had completely met its arms reduction obligations under START I, it continued to eliminate its strategic offensive arms. By 1 January 2010, it had eliminated some 1,600 ICBM and SLBM launchers, 3,100 ICBMs and SLBMs, 47 nuclear submarines and 67 heavy bombers. As at the beginning of this year, the Russian Federation had approximately 800 deployed delivery vehicles for strategic offensive arms and 3,900 warheads attributed to them under START I. A comparison of these figures with the data provided on article VI in our report to the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference shows the growing contribution of the Russian Federation to fulfilling its Treaty obligations.

94. The provisions of the new Treaty on strategic offensive arms reduction stipulate that each party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms so that, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers do not exceed:

- 700 for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers;
- 1,550 for warheads on them;
- 800 for deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers. This aggregate limit for deployed and non-deployed launchers and heavy bombers is thus established as a legal requirement in the Treaty. This makes it possible to limit the parties' "upload potential" (their capacity to swiftly build up the number of deployed warheads in times of crisis) and creates additional momentum for the elimination or conversion of the strategic offensive arms to be reduced.

95. With this Treaty, the Russian Federation and the United States have once again clearly demonstrated their desire for large-scale strategic offensive arms reductions. The parties have agreed to cut their aggregate number of warheads by one third (the "ceiling" under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions was 2,200 warheads) and to reduce the limit for strategic delivery vehicles by more than half (under START I the ceiling was 1,600, while the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions placed no limits on them).

96. While negotiating the new Treaty on strategic offensive arms, we were mindful that nuclear disarmament is impossible without taking into account current trends in the sphere of strategic defence weapons and that at present there are no restrictions on the deployment of strategic missile defence systems.

97. Once the new Treaty enters into force, the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions of 24 May 2002 between the Russian Federation and the United States will also cease to have effect. In fact the parties have already met their obligations under the latter Treaty.

98. Through the implementation of the 1987 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles, 1,846 land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500-5,500 km and 825 launchers for such missiles were destroyed. In all, over 3,000 nuclear warheads with a total yield of over 500,000 kilotons have been deactivated. We have put forward a proposal to make the obligations under that Treaty universal.

99. In terms of nuclear non-proliferation, the withdrawal by the Russian Federation of tactical nuclear weapons from Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics to its own territory is highly significant.

100. Only now, years later, is it possible to truly appreciate the scope and extraordinary complexity of this operation. The Russian Federation withdrew all tactical nuclear weapons to its territory in a relatively short time while also duly ensuring their technical safety and secure storage.

101. Russian nuclear weapons are under reliable control. The effectiveness of this control is enhanced by both organizational and technical measures. Since 1991, the total number of nuclear weapons storage facilities has been reduced fourfold, and the number of nuclear weapons stockpiles has been cut more than fivefold.

102. The Russian Federation has developed and implemented a range of measures to counter terrorist acts, and comprehensive security inspections of all nuclear- and radiation-hazardous facilities are conducted regularly.

103. 2009 marked the fifteenth anniversary of implementation of the Agreement concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons between the Governments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, also known as the Megatons to Megawatts programme. So far under this Agreement, over 350 tons of weapons-grade uranium have been irreversibly converted into low-enriched uranium. That is equivalent to 14,000 nuclear warheads and represents about 76 per cent of the highly enriched uranium intended for conversion under the Agreement.

104. This year, under the Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation signed in April 2010, the last reactor in the Russian Federation producing weapons-grade plutonium was halted. The Russian Federation will dispose of 34 tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium through irradiation in a BN-800 reactor.

105. The above-mentioned facts and the practical steps taken by the Russian Federation to meet its obligations confirm our willingness to follow a steady course towards genuine nuclear disarmament in compliance with the requirements of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Article VII

106. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is one of the main tools for the consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole and the Non-Proliferation Treaty in particular. By creating nuclear-weapon-free zones and thereby implementing article VII of the Treaty, States are in fact promoting the strengthening of regional and international stability and security and the enhancement of mutual trust. The Russian Federation consistently supports this process and cooperates with States' efforts to establish and formalize the status of such zones.

107. Considering the concern and desire of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to obtain legally binding assurances which would rule out

the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them, the Russian Federation, by signing the relevant Protocols, has provided such legally binding security assurances to all States which are parties to nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements. These assurances were confirmed by the Russian Federation under Security Council resolution 984 (1995). We confirm these commitments once again, as well as our intention to follow the same course as new nuclear-free zones are established.

108. The international community has gained considerable experience in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. We consider it vitally important to ensure that agreements institutionalizing them are fully compliant with the established principles and parameters for establishing such zones and with international law. Any breach of these requirements may cause complications with regard to the legal recognition of nuclear-weapon-free zones by nuclear Powers and their provision of the related security assurances. In this connection, we note the fundamental role of the principles and guidelines on the establishment and legalization of new nuclear-weapon-free zones adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1999.

109. The Russian Federation welcomes the 40 years of effective functioning of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the first international legal instrument establishing the nuclear-free status of an extensive and densely populated region, as well as its contribution to the process of further establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in the world.

110. The Russian Federation strictly complies with its commitments under Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which sets out the obligations of the nuclear Powers with respect to the States in the zone.

111. The historical significance of this instrument is that it established a precedent for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones that has largely determined the parameters for that process in other parts of the world.

112. We welcome the entry into force on 21 March 2009 of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk). We are convinced that the Treaty will contribute to the strengthening of peace and stability in the region. Apart from the fact that the Treaty establishes the first nuclear-free zone in the northern hemisphere, which in itself is highly significant, it also sets out an obligation for the States parties to bring into effect an additional protocol to an IAEA safeguards agreement within 18 months after the entry into force of the Treaty. This is the first time that the application of additional protocols has been made a legal obligation. We consider that this is an important step in the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system and the consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

113. We note that the Treaty of Semipalatinsk and its Protocol providing security assurances from nuclear Powers to the States parties to the Treaty were developed in full compliance with international law and take into account the 1999 recommendations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

114. The signature and ratification of the Protocol by all five nuclear-weapon States can ensure *the full and effective* functioning of the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone. We believe that easing States' concerns about the Treaty and its Protocol would assist the Central Asian States in furthering their consultations with States

that harbour doubts. The Russian Federation is prepared to cooperate further with such efforts.

115. The situation with respect to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, at a time when stability in the Middle East is important for both regional and international security, is a highly complicated matter. As in the past, there are States in the region which have not placed their nuclear capabilities under IAEA safeguards and which are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A number of States are not parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Biological Weapons Convention.

116. We believe that the optimal means of reaching a comprehensive solution to non-proliferation issues in the Middle East and achieving peace and stability in the region would be the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, as set out in the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and reaffirmed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

117. The Russian Federation is committed to the provisions of the 1995 resolution. We are convinced that the implementation of this resolution in its entirety would contribute to strengthening the security of all Middle Eastern States and would certainly strengthen international security as well. In this connection, in 2009 at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference, the Russian Federation proposed that specific steps should be taken to implement the 1995 resolution and proposed a set of measures that might assist in advancing towards its implementation, in the first instance through the establishment of dialogue between all the States concerned. Our proposal was to hold an international conference or meeting with the participation of all the States concerned — the Middle Eastern States above all — in order to consider the prospects for implementing the resolution in its entirety.

118. We also believe that it would be appropriate to appoint a special coordinator who would be authorized to hold consultations on this issue with the States of the Middle East region and who, during the course of the further review process, would present a report on the results of this work.

119. Moreover, in order to create a favourable climate for progress towards the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, all States in the region must sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The States on which the Treaty's entry into force depends could consider immediately the possibility of ratifying the Treaty as a first step in that process and a confidence-building measure.

120. As another confidence-building measure, we proposed that all Middle Eastern States should consider the possibility of voluntarily forgoing the establishment or development of capabilities in uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, while emphasizing that we do not question the right of States to produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We believe that the best guarantee for the exercise of this right would be through multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.

121. Undoubtedly, a key component for establishing a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery is to place under comprehensive

IAEA safeguards all nuclear facilities in the region that are not under such safeguards.

122. The Russian Federation welcomes the entry into force on 15 July 2009 of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). Our country signed Protocols I and II to the Treaty in 1996. In order to further assist the efforts of the African States along these lines, the Russian Federation has initiated the process of preparing for the ratification of the Protocols which it has signed.

123. The Russian Federation is ready to continue the process of settling the remaining issues relating to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok) through dialogue between the nuclear Powers and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Articles VIII, IX and X

124. The Russian Federation is pleased to note that 190 States are now parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which makes it one of the most widely represented international agreements. In order to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty, the Russian Federation is working actively at both the bilateral and the multilateral levels to have India, Pakistan and Israel become parties to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. While strictly observing the provisions of article IX, the Russian Federation has not changed its position as regards the presence of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. We continue, in accordance with the Treaty, to consider them non-nuclear-weapon States and expect them to comply with Security Council resolution 1172 (1998).

125. As regards the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its withdrawal from the Treaty, the Russian Federation is taking an active part in the process of settling the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula.

126. Recognizing its responsibility as a party to and depositary of the Treaty, the Russian Federation underlines the exceptional sensitivity of the issue of the withdrawal of States from the Treaty. We consider it necessary to minimize the possibility of situations in which States refuse to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty. We believe that making States more accountable for decisions to withdraw from the Treaty in accordance with article X could be one of the ways to strengthen the Treaty. This objective could be achieved by agreeing on a number of political measures and procedures which would be applied in such cases. However, such actions should not lead to a revision or reopening of the Treaty text.